COMMENTS

Standard-Setting Organizations:
Patents, Price Fixing, and Per Se Legality
PatrickD. Currant

Standard-setting organizations (SSOs), private groups that collaboratively select and adopt uniform technical standards for goods
and services, are a critical element of the modern economy. Competitors within an industry often seek to make competing products interoperable by establishing industry-wide technical standards. To accomplish this end, competing companies join SSOs and work together to
select particular technologies as industry standards. This process of
product standardization benefits both producers and consumers: It
promotes price competition among firms, creates demand-side
economies of scale, and encourages product innovation by reducing
the risks of future research and development efforts. Accordingly, antitrust enforcement agencies have recognized "the important role of
standard-setting in the technological innovation that will drive much
1
of this nation's competitive vigor in the 21st Century."
However, attempts by SSOs to avoid antitrust liability for price
fixing now endanger the viability of the standard-setting process.
When SSOs select patented technologies as industry standards, SSO
patent policies typically require patent owners to offer "fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" 2 licenses to SSO members. These licensing
obligations are left intentionally vague to avert price-fixing liability.
While this equivocal language has successfully insulated SSOs from
antitrust liability, patent owners and SSO members repeatedly have
been forced into high-risk litigation over the definition of "fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" license terms. This litigation has exposed both SSO members and patent owners to potential liability for
patent infringement and antitrust violations, and has consequently
created strong disincentives to take part in the SSO process. In turn,
these disincentives now threaten the important social and economic
benefits of standardization.
t
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A.B. 2001, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 2004, The University of Chicago.
In the Matter of Dell Computer Corp, 121 FTC 616,626 (1996).
For a discussion of SSO patent policies, see note 32 and accompanying text.
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In this Comment, I argue that the goals of antitrust enforcement
would be best served by allowing SSOs to operate without fear of antitrust liability when fixing the price terms of licenses for single-source
patents A rule of per se legality for single-source patent price bargaining would permit SSOs to bargain with patent owners over the
price of patent licenses before adopting patented technologies as industry standards. This bargaining system would obviate the need for
vague "fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" language in SSO policies, thereby eliminating high-risk litigation over the specific meaning
of those terms and preserving incentives to participate in SSOs.
In Part I of this Comment, I describe SSOs in detail, including
their welfare-enhancing functions, their relationship to patented technologies, and their connection to recent high-risk disputes over "fair,"
"reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" license terms. In Part II, I examine
antitrust precedent in general, and price-fixing precedent in particular,
and evaluate current rules in light of the broad goals of modem antitrust policy. I then argue that existing antitrust precedent poses a
threat to SSOs, thus warranting a shift in antitrust enforcement policy
in the context of standard setting. Finally, in Part III I propose a rule
of per se legality for single-source patent price bargaining. By allowing
SSO members to bargain collectively with patent owners over the
price of licenses, a new rule of per se legality for single-source patent
price bargaining would not only strengthen incentives to participate
vigorously in SSOs, but would also reduce the price of patent licenses,
increase access to industry standards, strengthen the beneficial effects
of standardization, and achieve the goals of antitrust enforcement
through market mechanisms.
I. STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE,

PURPOSE, AND PROCESS

SSOs are private groups of market participants, usually composed
of multiple competitors (both incumbents and entrants) oriented
horizontally and vertically within a single market (or several related
markets within a single industry). These competitors voluntarily collaborate in order to establish uniform technical specifications for par-

3 The phrase "single source" is used herein as a limiting principle, allowing price bargaining to occur only between SSOs and a single patent owner. Accordingly, the single-source rule
would exclude pooled, jointly owned, or cross-licensed proprietary technologies from the proposed system of bargaining and price fixing (although the rule would not exclude bargaining
over multiple patents originating from a single source). This limitation is necessary to prevent
SSO capture by multiple market participants; without a single-source rule, the proposed system
of patent price bargaining could quickly turn SSOs into vehicles for anticompetitive harm. For a
detailed discussion of single-source patent bargaining and its limitations, see Part III.B.
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ticular products and services., The SSOs intend the technical standards
thus created to ensure interoperability among competing products,
certify the quality of specific products, and provide a technical baseline for future research and product development Generally, uniform
technical standards benefit consumers by encouraging price competition between producers of interoperable products and benefit competitors by reducing the cost and risk of future research and development projects
Technical standards, and the SSOs that develop them, are a common and essential element of the modem economy.8 As early as 1987,
more than four hundred standard-setting groups had developed approximately thirty thousand voluntary standards Because standard
setting requires particular expertise in specialized product areas, new
SSOs are constantly forming to meet the needs of niche markets.0
A.

Benefits of Standard Setting

The specific economic benefits of standards can be divided into
three categories: greater product interoperability, beneficial network

4
See Melonie L. McKenzie, Note, How Should Competing Software Programs Marry?
The Antitrust Ramifications of Private Standard-Setting Consortia in the Software Industry, 52
Syracuse L Rev 139, 144-45 (2002) (noting that the typical SSO consists of "a compilation of
companies already established in the marketplace and of companies just entering the marketplace").
5 See Sean P. Gates, Standards,Innovation, and Antitrust:Integrating Innovation Concerns
into the Analysis of Collaborative Standard Setting, 47 Emory L J 583, 597 (1998) ("[Sltandards
can quickly convey information, assure quality, increase efficiency, and ensure compatibility."); id
at 601-12 (discussing how standards shift innovative activity away from radical product changes
and towards process improvements and the development of complementary products).
6 See Michael G. Cowie and Joseph P. Lavelle, Patents Covering Industry Standards: The
Risks to EnforceabilityDue to Conduct before Standard-SettingOrganizations,30 AIPLA 0 J 95,
99 (2002) (noting that interoperability standards "increase[ consumer welfare by enhancing consumer choice and reducing the costs of goods").
7
See In the Matter of Dell Computer Corp, 121 FTC 616,626 (1996) (noting the important
rule played by standard setting in encouraging technical innovation); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust
and Intellectual Property:Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 16 Berkeley Tech
L J 535, 551 (2001) (describing "the private standard-setting process" as "an essential device to
help introduce new products").
8
See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet StandardizationProblem,28 Conn L Rev
1041, 1081 (1996) ("[I]n certain industries the need for standardization is so great that it is impossible to compete effectively without group standardization efforts.").
9 See Maureen A. Breitenberg, National Institute of Standards and Technology, The ABCs
of Standards-Related Activities in the United States (May 1987), online at http://tnist.gov/ts/
htdocs/210/ncsci/stdpmr.htm (visited May 8,2003).
10 See Jennifer L. Gray, Internet Standard Setting Bodies: Antitrust Guidelines, in 21st Annual Institute on Computer Law 525, 527 (Practising Law Institute 2001) (noting the recent creation of several new SSOs, including RosettaNet, a collection of information technology and
semiconductor manufacturing companies, and the National Committee for Information Technology Standards, which promotes interoperability standards for information systems, storage media, and programming languages).
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effects, and increased rates of innovation. Each category provides
benefits to both consumers and producers, and acts to increase the
overall allocative efficiency within related product markets. This Part
will examine each of these categories in turn, and will illustrate the
important role that SSOs play in the modern economy.
1. Interoperability.
Uniform technical standards for a class of products ensure that
consumers can mix and match the goods of rival firms without fear of
product incompatibility. For example, a uniform technical specification
for videotapes facilitates consumer choice by allowing consumers to
choose between Maxell tapes and Sony tapes for their Sony camcorder. Accordingly, interoperability increases consumer welfare by promoting price competition between interoperable products." Furthermore, uniform technical standards reduce the information costs associated with acquiring a product in the first place, since consumers can
rely on their knowledge of interoperable products when evaluating
and comparing products.
2. Network effects.
In many industries, interoperability does more than facilitate
price competition. Uniform product standards can increase the value
of products for all consumers, creating a demand-side economy of
scale (in other words, a market where consumer demand for a product
increases as the product becomes more widely used). 3 These beneficial effects are referred to as "network effects," since they require a
network of interrelated products to occur. For example, a single isolated fax machine is of little value if there are no other fax machines
with which to communicate. However, the value of a fax machine
grows rapidly as interoperable machines join the existing network. If

11 See, for example, Cowie and Lavelle, 30 AIPLA Q J at 99 (cited in note 6) ("The benefits that accrue from interoperability standards are well established. Interoperability increases
consumer welfare by enhancing consumer choice and reducing the costs of goods.").
12
See Douglas D. Leeds, Raising the Standard:AntitrustScrutiny of Standard-Setting Consortia in High Technology Industries,7 Fordham Intel Prop, Media, & Enter L J 641,644 (1997)
("[S]tandardization permits easier consumer comparison between competing products because
the burden of acquiring information on the merits of two competing standards is avoided. Thus,
standardization reduces the cost of acquiring information."); David A. Balto, Standard Setting in
a Network Economy, in Intellectual Property Antitrust 499, 509 (Practising Law Institute 2001)
(Intellectual Property Course Handbook Series Number G-658) (arguing that standards "increase price competition, because standard technologies and products can be more readily compared and contrasted").
13 For a detailed discussion of network effects, including an in-depth look at economies of
scale on the demand side, see Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J Econ Persp 93 (Spring 1994).
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fax machines were to operate on rival networks, or if specific brands
of fax machines were to use incompatible standards, the value of individual fax machines would drop dramatically; consumers might be
forced to purchase and maintain multiple fax machines, using their

Xerox fax machine to communicate with others using the Xerox standard, and their Canon fax machine to communicate with others using
the Canon standard. By ensuring that different products can work
with each other, a single technical standard for product interoperability can eliminate the need for separate redundant products, raise the
value of all interoperable products in the network, benefit producers

by expanding consumer demand for their products, and benefit consumers by increasing the value of all products within a given network."4
The benefits created by network effects can be direct or indirect.
A direct benefit is the value added to the network when additional
users join, directly benefiting all network participants.'5 An indirect
benefit is the increased demand for complementary products or post-6
increases.'
purchase services that is created when a network's value
When suppliers respond to the increased value of the network by offering new complementary products or post-purchase services, existing and future network users receive the benefits of greater choice
V
and increased competition for these products.
Because of their application in many information technology
markets, network effects (and the technical standards for interoperability that create network effects) are an increasingly important element of the modern economy.'8 Beyond fax machines, possible network industries include phone systems, railroads, credit cards, and
computer software, hardware, and operating systems. In these industries, standard setting is crucial to creating and maintaining value for

14
This discussion of network effects draws heavily on the work of Douglas Lichtman and
Randal C. Picker in Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications:Iowa Utilities and Verizon, 2003
S Ct Rev (forthcoming), online at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/lichtman/resources/
verizon300.pdf (visited Apr 25, 2003).
15
See Gates, 47 Emory L J at 594-95 (cited in note 5).
16
See id at 594 (noting that in network industries, "the addition of a new user spurs de-

mand for complementary products or post-purchase service").
17
See id ("If more people buy Windows-based personal computers (PCs), more firms will
make applications software for that type of PC. If more people buy video disk players, more
stores will rent video disks. If more drivers choose Toyotas, more Toyota repair facilities will exist.").
18 See David J. Teece, Information Sharing, Innovation, and Antitrust, 62 Antitrust L J 465,
473-77 (1994) ("The advantages to society associated with the widespread adoption of common
standards can be very large, as network externalities are often considerable."); David A. Balto,
Standard Setting in the 21st Century Network Economy, 18 Computer & Internet L 5, 5 (June
2001) ("[N]etwork economics accounts for an increasingly larger share of the economy. It is also
the driving force behind many of the innovations and technological changes that occur.").
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consumers and producers, and to protecting the direct and indirect
benefits of network effects.
3. Innovation.
Uniform technical specifications are a critical element of research
and development efforts." Attempts to create new products carry a
substantial degree of risk, since there is no guarantee that commercial
research will ultimately yield viable products. In addition to uncertain
consumer preferences and unforeseeable market intervention, a
product may fail to yield positive returns because it has become technically obsolete by the time it is ready for market, or because
intervening technical developments will have eliminated the target
market for the product. Because uniform standards increase the
likelihood that a given technology will be used throughout a product
market, a firm can rely on a ready-made market for a new product so
long as the product is interoperable with other products employing
the existing industry standard."O Accordingly, firms face a lower degree
of risk when attempting to develop complementary products and postpurchase services in standardized markets.'
Uniform technical standards also encourage innovative improvements to existing products. By establishing a technical baseline
for incremental product improvements, firms are not required to duplicate the costs of creating the initial product, and can instead rely on
a certain level of functionality among the existing product and related
products.2 Standards also reduce the costs of developing and commercializing improved products, since their compatibility assures easy integration into existing markets by incorporating the industry standard
into their design.2 Standardization avoids the tremendous waste in19 See note 7 and accompanying text.
20 See Gates, 47 Emory L J at 599 (cited in note 5) (noting that a uniform industry standard "alleviates the risk of producing [new products] because the single standard ensures consumer acceptance").
21 See id at 612 ("Because compatibility standards ensure that products made by various
competitors can work together, these standards may encourage innovation in the complementary
goods market.").
22 See Leeds, 7 Fordham Intel Prop, Media, & Enter L J at 644 (cited in note 12) (noting
that a uniform industry standard "avoids inefficient duplication of investments in comparable,
yet incompatible, innovation").
23 See id at 648:
[S]tandardization may improve competition by promoting innovation. Without a single accepted and open standard, firms that wish to improve on current technology would be
forced to gain acceptance for an entire standard, rather than for a compatible product....
However, if a single accepted and open standard exists, consumers can adopt compatible
technological improvements without surrendering network externalities.
In turn, firms will be encouraged to take advantage of the network's size by investing in innovative improvements to existing standardized products.
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herent in developing functionally similar but incompatible products,
since firms are not forced to "reinvent the wheel" when developing
products that conform to existing technical standards. By reducing the
high fixed costs associated with research and development efforts,
standardization also reduces the natural barriers to entry faced by

new firms in markets characterized by high rates of innovation. In this
way, uniform technical standards for product functionality encourage
incumbents and entrants to compete through innovation, improving
the baseline functionality of their products while preserving
interop4
erability through adherence to the industry standard.
Finally, industry standards are important sources of innovation
because of the network effects they generate. Because network externalities create demand-side economies of scale, firms are encouraged
to tap into these high-value, high-demand markets by developing new
complementary products, creating new post-purchase services, or improving existing products that are used in the network. Without the
high consumer demand that standardization and network economies
create, many firms might not be willing to incur the high fixed costs
associated with new product research and development, or assume the
risks of those costly efforts. Given these powerful effects on innova24 See Lemley, 28 Conn L Rev at 1079 (cited in note 8) ("[Sltandard setting may also promote competition in the development of improvements to the standard, since each of the competitors may seek advantage over the others by improving the design in ways compatible with
the basic interface specifications.").
25 See Balto, 18 Computer & Internet L at 5 (cited in note 18) ("[N]etwork economics accounts for an increasingly larger share of the economy. It is also the driving force behind many of
the innovations and technological changes that occur.").
26 Although standardization encourages innovation by reducing the risks of research and
development, some critics argue that the costs of displacing or replacing entrenched standards
may stifle or delay future innovation. These critics argue that because transitions from old standards to new standards reduce the value of products adhering to the old standard, the costs of
switching from one network to another may create "lock-in" to a specific technology, since consumers will be unwilling to buy into new standards unless the improved functionality of the new
standard justifies the cost of abandoning existing investments in the old standard. See Gates, 47
Emory L J at 595-96 (cited in note 5) (arguing that the QWERTY standard for keyboards prevails to this day because lock-in effects prevent the adoption of a new, more efficient standard);
Leeds, 7 Fordham Intel Prop, Media, & Enter L J at 650-51 (cited in note 12):
It is possible that, even though every consumer would prefer a product based on the new
standard, the cost to the first switchers of abandoning the network, coupled with the uncertainty that other consumers would also switch and eventually build up the new network,
may be so high that no consumers are willing to be the first switchers.
Because the debate on lock-in through standardization is ongoing and involved, this Comment
will not address those particular concerns with the standard-setting process. However, it deserves
mention that many scholars have questioned the validity of the lock-in argument. See generally
S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J L & Econ 1 (1990) (criticizing
the use of QWERTY as an example of path dependant lock-in given the scarce scientific evidence on more efficient designs). See also Carole E. Handler and Julian Brew, The Application of

Antitrust Rules to Standards in the Information Industries-Anomaly or Necessity?, 14 No 11

Computer Law 1, 3 (Nov 1997) (using "the VHS VCR displacement of Betamax technology" to
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tion incentives, SSOs are critical components of technology markets
and industries driven by innovation.
B.

Proprietary Standards and Patent Policies

When firms collaborate to set product standards, they face an important choice about the type of standard they want to adopt. Technical standards come in two flavors: "open" standards, which are not
controlled by any one party and can be adopted freely by all market
participants; and "closed" or proprietary standards, which may be used
only with the permission of the standard owner.27 Standards that incorporate technologies covered by patents are examples of "closed"
standards, since they cannot be used without a license from the patent
owner. SSOs, and the firms they represent, only face the threat of
price-fixing liability when specifying the licensing terms for "closed"
standards, since "open" standards are always freely available and require no license. While SSOs could avoid price-fixing problems altogether by limiting themselves to open standards, this alternative would
limit the rate of technical progress in many industries. Closed standards typically offer greater technical benefits than open standards,
since the high-risk, high-cost research programs required to develop
cutting-edge technologies rely on patent protection to recoup the
costs of research and development."
Beyond the price-fixing problems that SSOs face when selecting
closed standards, proprietary technologies also pose access problems
not associated with non-patented technologies, because these closed
illustrate that lock-in effects are not insurmountable); Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis,
Path Dependence, in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest, eds, I Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics: The History and Methodology of Law and Economics 981,993 (Edward Elgar 2000)
(noting that "[i]n spite of Beta's two-year head start, the market shifted very quickly to a format
that offered an advantage to consumers," and concluding that "[w]hat this case actually demonstrates is not lock-in but rather the ability of markets to facilitate a switch from one path or standard to another"). Furthermore, any potential lock-in problems are directly addressed by the
update requirements of some SSOs. See Gates, 47 Emory L J at 654-55 (cited in note 5) (noting
that some SSOs have established policies requiring periodic upgrades of standardized technology and arguing that such policies should be mandatory).
27 See Kevin J.Arquit, Arman Y. Oruc, and Richard Wolfram, Antitrust, Intellectual Property, Standardsand Interoperability,in Intellectual PropertyAntitrust 157, 182 (Practising Law Institute 1998) (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No G-524) (discussing the differences between open and closed standards). Perhaps the
most popular form of an "open" standard is the TCP/IP protocol suite for switched-packet network traffic on the Internet. For a discussion of the Internet Engineering Task Force's standardization process, see S. Bradner, The Internet Standards Process § 7.1, online at http://www.ietf.org/
rfc/rfc2026.txt (visited Apr 25,2003).
28 See Robert P. Taylor, Pilkington, Microsoft, and S.C. Johnson Signal a Policy Shift at
DOJ, 9 Antitrust 23, 25 (Fall 1994) (noting "the benefits of licensing proprietary technology, including efficiencies derived from combining technology with capital and other inputs and expanded availability to consumers of new technology and the products it creates").
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standards cannot be used without a license from the patent owner.

When an SSO adopts a proprietary technology as an industry standard, the owner of that technology obtains considerable market
power, since all market participants adhering to the standard must obtain a license from the patent owner. This grant of market power can
(and often does) result in monopoly pricing for patent licenses,
thereby reducing license output and restricting access to the closed

standard." These access problems threaten the benefits of standardization described above, since uniform technical standards are of little
benefit to producers or consumers unless they are available to all
competing manufacturers and uniformly adopted throughout the industry.'°
In order to prevent the harms associated with monopoly pricing,
many SSOs have implemented patent policies regarding new proprietary standards. If a company's patent covers an industry standard,
SSOs typically require the company to disclose that patent to all SSO
members before the technology is considered as a potential industry
standard. If the company's patented technology is ultimately approved
as a new standard, that company is subsequently required to waive all
rights to the patent or offer SSO members licenses under "fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" terms." SSOs, however, never evaluate
the substance of these offers before or after the patented technology
29 See Dennis W. Carlton and Robert H. Gertner, Intellectual Property,Antitrust and Strategic Behavior 6 (NBER Working Paper 8976), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8976 (visited Apr 25, 2003) (noting that when a patent owner with monopoly power decides to offer licenses, "downstream firms often face a monopolistically set input price for the licensed technology"); James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao, Standard-Setting Consortia, Antitrust, and HighTechnology Industries,64 Antitrust L J 247,261 (1995):

In the case of a standard that effectively requires the use of a proprietary technology, the
standard ... can imbue the technology with market power that it previously lacked. Thus,
there is the potential for monopolization, or more minimally a raising of rivals' costs,
through the conjunction of an adopted standard and a proprietary technology.
See Lemley, 28 Conn L Rev at 1059-60 (cited in note 8):
The network externality effect ... suggests that network goods optimally should be priced
as cheaply as possible, to allow widespread adoption of the standard. A proprietary standard owned by a single company which can set whatever price it wants does not seem the
best way to achieve this goal.

30

(emphasis added). Note that the solution outlined in Part III of this Comment would eliminate
the access problem identified by Lemley, since the collective bargaining power of the SSO would
constrain the patent owner's ability to "set whatever price it wants."
31 See, for example, Townshend v Rockwell International Corp, 55 USPQ2d (BNA) 1011,
1018 (ND Cal 2000) (noting the patent owner's obligation to offer "reasonable" and "nondiscriminatory" licenses under an SSO patent policy); Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers' Standards Association Standards Board Operations Manual, cls 6.3.1-6.3.2 (2002),
online at http://standardsieee.org/guides/opman/sect6.html# (visited Apr 25, 2003) (requiring
that patent licenses "be made available to all [SSO members] either without compensation or
under reasonable rates, terms, and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination").
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is adopted as the industry standard.3 Patent owners need only promise
to supply "fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" licenses to SSO
members; beyond that requirement, SSO patent policies offer no
guidance as to what specific license terms should look like, nor do they
include penalty provisions for non-compliance. SSOs leave this language intentionally vague in order to avoid liability for price fixing."
This policy requires SSO members to negotiate individually with a
patent owner whose technology has recently attained considerable
market power, and leaves no role for the SSO in determining the
"fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" nature of subsequent patent
license offers.

C.

The Threat to Standard Setting: Conflicts over "Fair,"
"Reasonable," "Nondiscriminatory" License Terms

Because SSOs leave their patent policies intentionally vague to
avoid antitrust liability, conflicts over the precise licensing obligations
of the patent owner repeatedly arise. After a patent owner's proprietary technology is adopted as an industry standard by an SSO, individual SSO members must negotiate with the patent owner over the appropriate "fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" license terms.3
However, because the patent owner enjoys broad control over access
to the new industry standard, individual SSO members often face unreasonably high prices for patent licenses.3'
When SSO members reject a patent owner's license offer as unreasonable or discriminatory, the parties frequently resort to litigaFor example, the patent policy of the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau, a
32
wing of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), provides that if a standardization
proposal incorporates technology that is patented or is part of a pending patent application, the
patent holder should either waive his rights or "be willing to negotiate licenses with other parties
on a non-discriminatory basis on reasonable terms and conditions" International Telecommunications Union, ITU-T Patent Policy, online at http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/dbase/patent/patentpolicy.html (visited Apr 25, 2003). However, the policy goes on to state that "such negotiations
are left to the parties concerned and are performed outside the ITU-T." Id. The ITU does not
consider the substance of the licensing provisions in deciding whether or not to adopt a particular standard. Instead, the ITU assesses whether the patent holder is willing to negotiate such
terms, and leaves the actual negotiation over price to the individual parties. If a patent holder
claims to be willing to negotiate licenses "on reasonable terms and conditions," the ITU patent
policy provides that the "detailed arrangements arising from patents (licensing, royalties, etc.)"
must be negotiated by the individual parties. Id.
33 According to lawyers involved in the SSO process as FTC counsel or private representatives of high-tech companies, "SSOs have been reluctant to specify or become involved in setting
royalty rates for patented technology for fear that they will be accused of price fixing or another
violation of the antitrust laws." Cowie and Lavelle, 30 AIPLA Q J at 102 (cited in note 6). See
also Gray, Internet Standard Setting Bodies at 534 (cited in note 10) (advising SSOs to "[a]void
using the standards setting body as a means of price fixing, for example, by fixing licensing
fees").
34 See note 31 and accompanying text.
35
See Carlton and Gertner, IntellectualProperty at 6 (cited in note 29).
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tion. 3 In such litigation, patent owners typically allege patent infringement,37 while SSO members typically allege patent misuse, attempted monopolization, and breach of implied contract."6 These disputes carry great risks, both for SSO members and for patent owners.
SSO members risk liability for patent infringement, and perhaps willful infringement, which carries treble damages. 9 Patent owners risk
patent cancellation or unenforceability of their patents,'o compulsory
royalty-free licensing," or antitrust liability, which may result in an
award of treble damages. 2
Moreover, litigation over "fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" license terms is unusually long and protracted, imposing significant costs on patent owners and SSO members engaged in these disputes (as well as the public, which is forced to bear the lawsuits' administrative costs). '
36
See, for example, Agere Systems Guardian Corp v Proxim, Inc, 190 F Supp 2d 726,735
(D Del 2002) (dispute between an SSO member and a patent owner over "reasonable and nondiscriminatory" terms for patent licenses); Townshend, 55 USPQ2d at 1018 (dispute between an
SSO member and the owner of a standardized technology over "reasonable terms and conditions" for a patent license); ESS Technology,Inc v PC-Tel,Inc, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 23227, *2-3
(ND Cal) (dispute between an SSO member and the owner of a standardized technology over
"reasonable" and "non-discriminatory" patent license terms).
37 See Agere Systems, 190 F Supp 2d at 728 (addressing allegations of patent infringement
by SSO member); Townshend, 55 USPQ2d at 1014 (same).
38 See Agere Systems, 190 F Supp 2d at 728 (describing SSO member's claim that
patent
owner's patent was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct); ESS Technology, 1999 US Dist
LEXIS 23227 at *6-7 (dismissing SSO member's claim that patent owner attempted to monopolize the market for computer modems); id at *9-10 (allowing SSO member's claim for specific
performance of patent owner's implied contract with the SSO "to negotiate licenses to [SSO
members] on a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable terms and conditions").
39 See 35 USC § 284 (2000) (allowing treble damages for willful patent infringement). The
size of these damages can be astounding; damages for patent infringement are among the largest
awards ever ordered by American courts. See David Hricik, Remedies of the Infringer:The Use
by the Infringer of Implied and Common Law FederalRights, State Law Claims,and Contractto
Shift Liability for Infringement of Patents,Copyrights; and Trademarks, 28 Tex Tech L Rev 1027,
1033-34 (1997) (noting that damages for patent infringement "are at an all-time high," averaging
over $2 million per case, with the two largest awards for patent infringement in 1991 totaling $1.1
billion).
40 See United States v American Bell Telephone Co, 128 US 315, 373 (1888) (holding that
the United States can sue for the cancellation of a patent); Townshend, 55 USPQ2d at 1024
(evaluating and rejecting SSO member's claim that patent owner's patent was unenforceable due
to patent misuse).
41 See United States v General Electric Co, 115 F Supp 835,843-46 (D NJ 1953) (ordering
royalty-free patent licensing "[iun view of the fact that General Electric achieved its dominant
position in the industry and maintained it in great measure by its extension of patent control");
In the Matter of Eli Lilly and Co, 95 FTC 538,546-51 (1980) (entering consent decree requiring
royalty-free licensing of certain patents for a period of five years).
42
See, for example, Cowie and Lavelle, 30 AIPLA Q J at 100 (cited in note 6) (noting that
in a dispute over licensing practices, "the patent holder may risk a treble-damages action under
the Sherman Act").
43 See Robert A. Skitol, The Shifting Sands of Antitrust Policy:Where It Has Been, Where It
Is Now, Where It Will Be in Its Third Century, 9 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 239, 266 (1999) (noting
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Given the potential liability and substantial cost accompanying
litigation over "fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" license terms,
vague SSO patent policies have greatly increased the cost and risk associated with selecting a proprietary standard. In turn, this increased
risk discourages SSO participation, either by SSO members or patent
owners. Indeed, many firms are for the first time questioning whether
participation in SSOs is justified, given the potential liability exposure." Liability concerns are becoming more widespread, and if left
unchecked, threaten the viability of the SSO process in many industries.'
By increasing the costs associated with SSO participation, conflicts over "fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" license terms
jeopardize the beneficial effects of technical standardization. To preserve SSO activity and enjoy the benefits of standardization, these
high-risk conflicts must be avoided. Although these conflicts could
easily be prevented if SSOs specified licensing terms prior to the
adoption of a proprietary standard, price-fixing liability stands in the
way of an efficient resolution.
II. ANTITRUST, PATENTS, AND PRICE FIXING:
PRECEDENT AND PRINCIPLES

Generally, antitrust law emphasizes maximizing allocative efficiency through lower prices and increased output. As noted in Part I,
uniform technical standards promote those goals by increasing competition and reducing research costs. However, despite these procompetitive benefits of standard setting, this Part argues that current
precedent threatens SSOs with liability for price fixing if their patent
policies require anything more specific than "fair," "reasonable,"
"nondiscriminatory" license terms. Because price-fixing precedent
does not presently reflect the procompetitive effects of standardization and SSO activity, and instead necessitates the vague language in
that "virtually all kinds of antitrust litigation - government and private alike - take too long and
cost too much"); Amanda Kay Esquibel, The Rule of Avoidable Consequencesin Antitrust Cases:

A Law and Economics Approach, 26 Hofstra L Rev 891,915 n 142 (1998) (lamenting "the protracted and expensive nature of antitrust litigation" and suggesting that "investing monies and
efforts elsewhere may yield a greater return than the payment of those same funds to counsel
and an array of experts"). See also Roger M. Milgrim, 3 Milgrim on Licensing § 18.42 at 18-69
(Matthew Bender 2002) ("[M]ost corporate counsel have concluded that patent litigation is the
most expensive form of litigation, surpassing even so notoriously complex and expensive a form
as antitrust litigation.").
44 See Cowie and Lavelle, 30 AIPLA Q J at 102 (cited in note 6) (noting that the risk associated with disputes over patent license terms is "threatening to chill legitimate standard-setting
activity," and that many groups "are beginning to question whether participation in an SSO is
justified").
45 See id (noting that litigation over vague 8SO policies endangers the feasibility of standard-setting activity).
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SSO policies that causes high-risk litigation between SSO members
and patent owners, this Part concludes that price-fixing rules should
be reexamined in light of traditional and modem antitrust concerns.
A. Goals of Antitrust Enforcement
Over the past several decades, antitrust enforcement has undergone a small revolution, shifting its emphasis away from intent and
towards economic effects. This economics-focused view of antitrust

law, often referred to as the Chicago School, 7 has exerted considerable
influence on antitrust enforcement and has visibly influenced the Supreme Court's modern antitrust jurisprudence.'
The Chicago School uses maximization of consumer welfare as
the guiding principle for antitrust enforcement decisions, with reduced
prices and increased output serving as rough measures for success.
Those principles are still regarded as the main goal of antitrust en46 See, for example, John E. Kwoka, Jr. and Lawrence J. White, The Antitrust Revolution:
Economic-%Competition, and Policy 1 (Oxford 3d ed 1999):

[Olver the past twenty years, there has been a revolution in U.S. antitrust policy. This revolution has involved the ascendence of economics in antitrust policymaking, with repercussions throughout the institutions and enforcement practices of antitrust. Economic analysis
now plays a crucial role in determining what cases the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission actually pursue.... Courts have endorsed a central role for economics in rendering their own decisions.
47
The term "Chicago School" is used to refer to a body of antitrust views, first articulated
by Aaron Director in the 1950s and expanded upon by Richard Posner and Robert Bork in the
1970s, emphasizing economic analysis of monopoly and advocating the use of economics as a
tool for effective antitrust enforcement policy. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago
School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U Pa L Rev 925 (1979) (detailing the origins and ideas of the
Chicago School).
48 See A. Douglas Melamed and Ali M. Stoeppelwerth, The CSU Case: Facts Formalism
and the Intersection of Antitrust and IntellectualProperty Law, 10 Geo Mason L Rev 407,416-17
(2002) ("[S]ince the Chicago School began to influence antitrust policy in the late 1970's and
1980's, antitrust doctrine has crystallized around sound notions of economic analysis."); Dror
Ben-Asher, What's The Connection? Vietnam, the Rule of Law, Human Rights and Antitrust, 21
Houston J Intl L 427, 441 n 63 (1999) ("In the United States, largely due to the influence of the
Chicago School, moder antitrust adjudication is almost exclusively concerned with maximization of consumer welfare.").
49
The first Supreme Court decisions reflecting a Chicago School perspective were not decided until the late 1970s. See Broadcast Music, Inc v CBS; Inc, 441 US 1, 19-24 (1979) (holding
blanket license agreement among rivals affecting price is not illegal per se if it substantially lowers transaction costs under the rule of reason); ContinentalTV, Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US
36,57-59 (1977) (holding that vertical non-price restraints are not illegal per se given the important economic justifications for these restrictions); Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc,
429 US 477,488-89 (1977) (holding damages remedy unavailable to rival challenging merger under antitrust laws, since its alleged injury-increased competition-was not an injury that antitrust laws were intended to address). However, the Chicago School's influence appeared as early
as 1975 in appellate decisions taking supply substitution into account in defining markets. See
generally Jonathan B. Baker, The Problem with Baker Hughes and Syufy: On the Role of Entry
in Merger Analysis, 65 Antitrust L J 353, 354-56 (1997) (discussing appeals court decisions employing a Chicago School analysis).
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forcement today. However, given the particular characteristics of the
modern information economy, many antitrust scholars have begun to
emphasize other important goals of antitrust enforcement, including
the peculiar economics of network industries and the importance of
innovation. As the following sections will demonstrate, both the traditional and modem views of antitrust enforcement support policies designed to protect SSOs and the procompetitive benefits they generate.
1. Antitrust and consumer welfare.
Traditionally, antitrust policies have been directed towards maximizing consumer welfare. In the antitrust context, consumer welfare
refers to the social gain created by a perfectly competitive market organization and pricing scheme.- This consumer welfare measure includes both consumer surplus (defined as the price difference between
what a consumer pays for a product and what she is willing to pay)
and producer surplus (defined as the price difference between what a
producer sells its product for and the minimum price at which the
producer would be willing to sell)." Accordingly, consumer welfare is
not concerned with a pricing system's distributional effects, but rather
with the overall allocative efficiency in a market, making no distinctions between benefits to producers or consumers."
When prices are set competitively, consumer welfare is maximized, creating the optimum allocative efficiency.53 However, when
prices are set monopolistically, the resulting decline in consumer surplus exceeds the increase in producer surplus, creating deadweight
loss and reducing allocative efficiency!' Antitrust law is therefore concerned with reducing monopoly prices, thereby increasing output and
returning the market to its efficient equilibrium." This traditional focus on consumer welfare has clear implications in the SSO context: If
the owners of patented technologies accepted as industry standards
are charging monopoly prices for patent licenses-and the evidence

50 See Herbert Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice § 2.3c at 74-76 (West 2d ed 1999) (defining "consumer welfare" as used in antitrust precedent and commentary as "maximizing allocative efficiency").
51

See id.

However, one of the central tenants of Chicago School antitrust analysis is that by increasing allocative efficiency, we will over time lower prices and increase output, directly benefiting consumers. See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:A Policy At War Wih Itself 90-91
(Basic 1978) ("The law's mission is to preserve, improve, and reinforce the powerful economic
mechanisms that compel businesses to respond to consumers.").
53 See Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy § 2.3c at 75 (cited in note 50) (discussing optimum levels of efficiency in a "Pareto potential" model).
52

54

See id.

55

See id.
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suggests that they are-- traditional antitrust enforcement principles
would support policies designed to return those prices to their competitive levels.
2.

Modern antitrust concerns.

The particular economic realities of the modern economy, including the importance of product interoperability, the increasing significance of innovation, and the prevalence of network industries, have
already begun to shape the policies of modern antitrust enforcers.57

Many industries, especially high-technology industries, are driven by
innovation and require continuous research and development to create new products and services. The critical importance of innovation
has led scholars,8 as well as officials at the Department of Justice and

the Federal Trade Commission,59 to advocate antitrust policies that encourage increased iinovation. Antitrust enforcement agencies have
responded to these concerns, incorporating for the first time a formal
analysis of innovation competition and dynamic efficiency into standard merger analysis.6° Furthermore, antitrust enforcement has recognized the importance of network industries to the modern economy.
56

See note 29.

For example, the former Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission recently noted the
importance of innovation in growth markets, and recognized that "market participants' incentives and opportunities to innovate are increasingly important in the intellectual propertyintensive new economy." Pitofsky, 16 Berkeley Tech L J at 540 (cited in note 7). See also Richard
J. Gilbert and Steven C. Sunshine, IncorporatingDynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 Antitrust L J 569, 569-70 (1995) (advocating a close examination of effects innovation as part of standard merger analysis). At the time of publication,
Gilbert and Sunshine were the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics and the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Mergers, respectively, in the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
58 See Pitofsky, 16 Berkeley Tech L J at 539 (cited in note 7) (noting that "innovation competition can yield great consumer benefits" and arguing that "incentives to innovate must be protected in intellectual property markets"); Gates, 47 Emory L J at 585-90 (cited in note 5) (discussing the importance of innovation in the modern economy, and advocating that courts incorporate effects on innovation into any antitrust analysis of standard-setting activities).
59 See Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Competition and Innovation:Bedrock of the American Economy, Address before
the University of Kansas Law School (Sept 19, 1996), online at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
speeches/960919ks.htm (visited Apr 25, 2003) (noting that "innovation is critically important to
the advancement of this nation's economic interests," and therefore advocating antitrust policies
that "make sure that private restraints do not narrow the potential sources of innovation");
Christine A. Varney, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, Why Innovation MarketAnalysis
Makes Sense (March 15, 1995) (FTC News Release), available on Westlaw at 1995 WL 112078
(recognizing that "antitrust enforcers have a role to play in ensuring that competition among
innovators is not reduced or retarded").
60 See United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust
Guidelinesfor the Licensing of IntellectualProperty § 3.2.3 at 10-11 (1995) (requiring agencies to
conduct an analysis of "innovation markets" when mergers or joint ventures would impact research and development efforts). It should be noted that antitrust law has long recognized the
57
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Since network effects directly benefit producers and consumers
by increasing the value of each product in the network, and indirectly
benefit network participants by encouraging innovation directed toward new and improved products and post-purchase services,6' the
procompetitive effects of networks and standardization have become
important considerations for modern antitrust policy.2 Accordingly,
programs designed to encourage innovation and preserve beneficial
network effects--for example, by preserving incentives to participate
in SSOs and establish interoperable products-would enjoy the support of modern antitrust policy.
B.

Price Fixing and Patents

As noted above, the traditional and modern goals of antitrust policy lend support to the notion that SSO activity should be encouraged
and protected, given its numerous procompetitive effects. Accordingly,
a system of SSO price bargaining that increased access to industry
standards and preserved incentives to participate in SSOs would serve
the purposes of antitrust policy. However, this Part demonstrates that
price-fixing precedent stands as a barrier to the proposed bargaining
system; any SSO attempting to negotiate over the price of patent licenses could quickly incur Sherman Act liability for price fixing.
While the goals and guiding principles of antitrust enforcement
have undergone significant changes in the past 30 years,63 price-fixing
precedent has not changed significantly over the past century. Concerted efforts to raise the price of a product above competitive levels
have been illegal for over one hundred years.' Ordinarily, the policy
against price fixing is entirely consistent with the traditional and modimportance of temporary monopoly in creating new products or cost-saving processes, and has
therefore been receptive to Schumpeter's ideas regarding dynamic efficiency through "creative
destruction." See generally Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 83
(Harper 3d ed 1950). However, the increasing importance of innovation in modem markets has
prompted the Department of Justice to emphasize the importance of innovation in the modem
economy, and to stress that the ultimate goals of antitrust are not competition, but allocative and
dynamic efficiency. See William J. Kolasky and Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the
Integrationof Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, Address at the 20th Anniversary of the 1982 Merger Guidelines, 26-33 (June 10, 2002), online at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/hmerger/11254.pdf (visited May 15, 2003) (noting that the revised 1997 Merger Guidelines
heavily emphasize the procompetitive effects of innovation and the goal of attaining increased
dynamic efficiency).
61 See notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
62 See Federal Trade Commission Staff, 1 Anticipating the 21st Century: Competition Policy
in the New High-Tech, Global Marketplace ch 10 at 11-13 (1996) (noting that network industries
"bear characteristics that should command an antitrust enforcer's special attention").
63 See notes 46-47.
64 See United States v Trans-MissouriFreightAssociation, 166 US 290, 333, 340-42 (1897)
(finding price-fixing agreements illegal regardless of the "reasonableness" of the fixed rates);
United States vJoint Traffic Association,171 US 505, 574-77 (1898) (same).
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ern goals of antitrust enforcement, since cartelization of a market
quickly leads to allocative inefficiency and deadweight loss.6 However,
price-fixing liability extends beyond attempts to raise prices: It encompasses all arrangements attempting to stabilize or tamper with
competitive pricing.6 The law prohibits all attempts to fix prices, regardless of effect. Prohibited attempts to fix prices may be horizontal
or vertical in their orientation, may attempt to create higher or lower
prices, and may implicate manufacturers, retailers, or purchasers. 61
While minimum price-fixing arrangements are the most intuitive concern of antitrust enforcement, maximum price fixing is also an important antitrust concern, since monopsony-a market with only one
buyer and many sellers, in which the buyer uses its unequal bargaining
power to drive prices below competitive levels -is a significant source
of allocative inefficiency and deadweight loss.68
65 See W. Kip Viscusi, John M. Vernon, and Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Economics of
Regulation andAntitrust 127 (MIT 3d ed 2000) ("A cartel, in contrast to a merger that integrates the
productive activities of the firms, can lead only to [deadweight] losses .... The 'inherent nature' of
price fixing is to suppress competition, and there are no beneficial effects."); Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy at § 4.1 (cited in note 50) (discussing the harmful economic effects of price
fixing).
66
See United States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 US 150,221-26 n 59 (1940) (prohibiting
any agreement that "tampers" with market prices).
67
See, for example, Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 US 332, 348 (1982)
(holding horizontal agreements fixing maximum prices illegal per se); Kiefer-Stewart Co v Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, 340 US 211,260 (1951) (holding agreements fixing maximum resale prices illegal per se); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc v American Crystal Sugar Co, 334 US 219, 223-24
(1948) (holding that buyer cartels aimed at fixing prices below competitive levels are illegal per
se); Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 US at 221 (finding horizontal arrangements to "tamper" with prices
illegal per se); Dr.Miles Medical Co v John D. Park & Sons Co, 220 US 373,408-09 (1911) (finding a vertical price-fixing agreement illegal per se).
68
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing,48 U Chi L Rev 886,886 (1981) (noting that monopsonistic maximum price fixing "drives a wedge between the competitive price and
the market price, to the detriment of efficiency"). Although the solution advocated in Part III introduces consolidation of buyers and therefore raises monopsony concerns, the probability of
anticompetitive harm is extremely low. True monopsony results in reduced output by decreasing
the number of sellers in a market. See Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy at § 1.2b (cited in
note 50). However, "if a maximum price agreement serves only to ... overcome conditions that
have elevated price above marginal cost, the objections to monopoly and monopsony do not apply." Easterbrook, 48 U Chi L Rev at 886. As discussed in Part 1.B, the current pricing system
used by SSOs encourages monopoly pricing for patent licenses, since patent owners conduct individual negotiations with SSO members only after their technology attains market power. By
reversing the bargaining order and allowing buyers to consolidate, the single-source price bargaining system advocated in Part III would help return prices to competitive levels by equalizing
the relative bargaining power of SSO participants and patent owners. Indeed, the bilateral monopoly created by the proposed bargaining system would correct monopoly distortions in the
patent license market in much the same manner that unionization corrects for monopsony distortions in labor markets. See, for example, George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price 207-08 (Macmillan 3d ed 1966) (noting that "when a monopolistic seller deals with a monopolistic buyer,"
both firms will rationally maximize their profits by returning price and output to their competitive levels). Accordingly, monopsony objections do not apply to the proposed bargaining system,
because that system would correct existing distortions in market pricing procedures and increase,
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In the patent license context, price-fixing policy must take additional factors into consideration. Patent owners are granted a legal
monopoly over their invention for the life of the patent, and have the
statutory right to refuse to license their technology to others.6 Because
patent owners are entitled to restrict license output and charge the
°
monopoly price for their patented product or technology, the Supreme Court in United States v General Electric Co' granted patent
owners immunity from price-fixing liability for license terms dictating
minimum resale prices, reasoning that a patent owner's right to set
prices for its invention must not be undermined by antitrust law."
However, more recent decisions have taken a harder line against
all forms of patent price fixing, limiting price-fixing immunity under
General Electric to instances of individual dealings with a single pat3
ent owner and a single patent licensee. Furthermore, the Department
of Justice has stated that although General Electric is still good law, it
will evaluate horizontal price restraints contained in patent licenses
under the rule of reason, weighing efficiency prospects and procomand
petitive benefits against the potential anticompetitive harms,
4 will
using a per se analysis.'
licenses
such
in
restraints
naked
evaluate
Given these broad prohibitions against price fixing, SSOs have
reason to be wary of antitrust liability. By fixing the terms, price, or
output levels of patent licenses offered to SSO members, an SSO
could be liable under several theories: horizontal price fixing (if
viewed as the patent owner's competitor in the market for technological standards); vertical price fixing6 (if viewed as a consumer of pat-

rather than decrease, the patent owner's license output.
69 See 35 USC § 271(d) (2000) (establishing a patent owner's right to refuse licenses for the
patented technology, or to require cross-licensing in the absence of market power).
70

See id.

272 US 476 (1926).
See id at 494. In the wake of GeneralElectric, courts have extended immunity to patent
owners for output restrictions in patent licenses as well. See Ethyl Corp v Hercules Powder Co,
232 F Supp 453,460 (D Del 1963); United States v Parker-Rust-ProofCo, 61 F Supp 805,812 (ED
Mich 1945).
73 See, for example, United States v United States Gypsum Co, 333 US 364,399-400 (1948)
(holding that patent owners can be liable under antitrust law for licensing arrangements fixing
prices industry wide, and arguing that GeneralElectric "gives no support for a patentee, acting in
concert with all members of an industry, to issue substantially identical licenses to all members of
the industry under the terms of which the industry is completely regimented"); Newburgh Moire
Co v Superior Moire Co, 237 F2d 283, 291-94 (3d Cir 1956) (limiting General Electric to an
agreement between a single patentee and a single licensee).
See United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelinesfor the Licensing of Intel74
lectual Property § 5.1 at 24 (cited in note 60).
75
See Maricopa,457 US at 332 (holding horizontal maximum price-fixing agreements illegal per se).
76 See Mandeville Island Farms,334 US at 223-24 (holding that buyer cartels comprised of
retailers and distributors are illegal per se).
71

72
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ented technologies); or a combination thereof" (if viewed as a third
party to the industry coordinating exchanges between patent owners
and market participants). Therefore, under existing rules of antitrust
enforcement, SSOs are faced with a Hobson's choice: implement patent policies with vague "fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" requirements that lead to high-risk litigation, or forego patented technologies altogether. Because the threat of antitrust enforcement imposes these unappealing choices on SSOs and necessitates the vague
"fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" language in SSO policies,
current antitrust policy should be reassessed to reflect the important
welfare-enhancing functions performed by SSOs.
III. SINGLE-SOURCE PATENT PRICE BARGAINING SHOULD BE
DECLARED PER SE LEGAL

Although existing precedent would expose SSOs to antitrust liability for specifying the price terms of patent licenses, this Part proposes that the goals of antitrust law can be achieved by adopting a
rule of per se legality for single-source patent price bargaining between SSOs and patent owners. Under this bargaining system, an SSO
would be free to negotiate specific license terms with patent owners,
including the pricing schemes for licenses to SSO members, prior to
adopting a proprietary technology as an industry standard. As a result
of this bargaining process, the price of patent licenses would be reduced, access to proprietary industry standards would improve, and
firms with new access to the proprietary standard would enter the
market and increase competition. Moreover, the proposed bargaining
system would eliminate high-risk conflicts over "fair," "reasonable,"
"nondiscriminatory" license terms, thereby preserving incentives to
participate in the SSO process and protecting the existing social benefits of product standardization.
A. Per Se Legality Is an Established Element of Antitrust Law
Antitrust law has long separated activities into categories of per
se analysis as an efficiency tool, thereby reducing administrative costs
and shifting burdens from plaintiffs to defendants when a behavior is
clearly procompetitive or anticompetitive.'s Although per se rules are
77 See United States Gypsum Co, 333 US at 364 (holding attempts to fix the price of patent
licenses for an "entire industry" illegal).
78 See United States v ContainerCorp ofAmerica, 373 US 333,341 (1969) (arguing that per
se categories "are justified on the assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far
outweigh the losses and that significant administrative advantages will result.... [T]he potential
competitive harm plus the administrative costs of determining in what particular situations the
practice may be harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may result."); Viscusi, Vernon and
Harrington, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust at 125-27 (cited in note 65) (discussing the
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more commonly used to classify practices as illegal,79 rules of per se legality are also established elements of antitrust law.
In United States v Colgate & Co,n0 the Supreme Court unequivo-

cally exempted manufacturers from antitrust liability for terminating
retailers that failed to adhere to the manufacturer's suggested retail
price, thus establishing the practice as per se legal." Although concerted attempts at vertical price maintenance were illegal per se,' the

Colgate Court carved out a category of behavior that was beyond the
purview of antitrust enforcement, and exempted that category of behavior from liability." This analysis was entirely in line with the traditional rationale for per se categorization of behaviors, since the administrative costs of reviewing all unilateral attempts to maintain
minimum resale prices far outweigh the potential for anticompetitive
harm.
Since Colgate, courts have extended per se legality to other areas
of antitrust enforcement,w and academic commentators have suggested that the ranks of per se legality be expanded." Indeed, any
category of behavior potentially within the purview of antitrust law
but without any serious potential for anticompetitive harm is a potential candidate for categorization as per se legal, since evaluating specific instances of those behaviors would almost certainly impose ad-

ministrative costs far in excess of the potential harm associated with
the behavior." Antitrust law has long recognized that the categorizarationale for and economic benefits of categorical analysis).
79 See, for example, Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 US 332, 348 (1982)
(holding horizontal price fixing illegal per se); Kiefer-Stewart Co v Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
340 US 211 (1951) (holding vertical price fixing illegal per se).
80 250 US 300 (1919).
81 See id at 305-07.
82
See Dr.Miles Medical Co v John D. Park & Sons Co, 220 US 373,408-09 (1911).
83 See Colgate, 250 US at 307.
84
See Concord Boat Corp v Brunswick Corp, 207 F3d 1039, 1062 (8th Cir 2000) (holding
that heavy price discounts, so long as prices remain above costs, are per se legal); Morgan v Ponder, 892 F2d 1355,1360 (8th Cir 1989) (holding that "prices above average total cost are legal per
se").
85 See Peter Nealis, Note, Per Se Legality: A New Standard in AntitrustAdjudication under
the Rule of Reason, 61 Ohio St L J 347, 380-82 (2000) (advocating the abolition of the rule of
reason in favor of a more efficient "per se legality" standard in antitrust law); Richard A. Posner,
The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:Per Se Legality, 48 U Chi L
Rev 6,8 (1981) (proposing that purely vertical restrictions on distribution, including price restrictions, be declared legal per se).
86 See Posner, 48 U Chi L Rev at 23 (cited in note 85):
The same considerations of judicial economy and legal certainty that justify the use of per
se rules of illegality in some cases justify the use of rules of per se legality in others. Given
the absence of either theoretical or empirical grounds for condemning [a practice] as anticompetitive, to declare [that practice] legal per se would serve both to lighten the burden
on the courts and to lift a cloud of debilitating doubt from practices that are usually and
perhaps always procompetitive.
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tion of behaviors as legal or illegal must change over time in light of
new economic realities." Per se legality for SSO price bargaining
would not only reduce administrative costs and provide SSO members
with much-needed legal certainty, but would also create substantial
economic benefits by reducing the price of patent licenses, increasing
access to industry standards, fostering competition in standardized
markets, and preserving incentives to participate vigorously in SSOs.
As the remainder of Part III demonstrates, these substantial procompetitive effects justify recategorization of single-source patent price
bargaining as per se legal.
B.

Single-Source Patent Price Bargaining Defined

Under the proposed bargaining system, SSOs would be free to
consider specific license terms as part of their negotiations with patent
owners and could require patent owners to offer SSO members patent
licenses with specific price, output, and length terms before adopting a
proprietary technology as an industry standard. By including price as
an element of the SSO selection process, SSOs would be free to balance the technological advantages of a proprietary standard against its
owner's pricing requirements, making decisions based both on technical excellence as well as access to the standard. Although some might
object to this bargaining system on the grounds that it would weigh
technical gains against price and reduce the overall pace of technical
progress, the criticism would be unwarranted. The price and access restrictions associated with proprietary standards are already important
considerations in the SSO selection process. Allowing SSOs to engage in negotiations for specific price terms would only improve the
accuracy of the current process, allowing SSOs to correctly gauge the
cost of potential standards and make appropriate tradeoffs between
technical functionality and commercial viability.

87 See, for example, State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3,18 (1997) (holding that there is "insufficient economic justification for per se invalidation of vertical maximum price-fixing agreements"); Broadcast Music, Inc v CBS, Inc, 441 US 1, 24-25 (1979) (holding that a fixed-price music licensing arrangement was not illegal per se, given the additional economic benefits created
by the licensing arrangement); Continental T, Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36, 59 (1977)
(holding that because of possible efficiencies, vertical non-price restraints are no longer illegal
per se).
88 See Mark A. Lemley, Standardizing Government Standard-Setting Policy for Electronic
Commerce, 14 Berkeley Tech L J 745,756 (1999):

The right choice between open and closed standards is a complex one. Factors that go into
determining social welfare include the technical quality of the standards, the possibility of
improving those standards over time, the variety and price of products that embody the
standards, and the size of the market that will result, as well as the speed of adoption and
durability of the winning standard.
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Such a system of price bargaining would be allowed only over
one or more patents originating from a single source, in order to prevent "capture" in an SSO setting.- When patents are pooled into a collective entity, the interests of many competitors whose patents make
up the pool may overlap.' These overlapping interests may create a
collusive desire to raise the price of patent licenses and that desire

could be satisfied through the participation of multiple patent owners
in the SSO process (either by co-opting the SSO selection process directly, or by gradually reducing the adversarial nature of the price
bargaining process).
In contrast, when patents originate from a single source, the bargaining process between SSO members and the patent owner would
be marked by a purely adversarial desire to reduce the costs of patent
licenses. This adversarial relationship is crucial to effective bargaining.
If, to the contrary, the interests of several SSO members align with
those of the patent owner, or once several SSO members combine to
represent a single pooled technology, the potential for cartelization
and "capture" is too great to justify per se legality. 1 Patent pools, joint
ventures, and cross-licensed technologies should therefore fall outside
89
By "capture," I refer to the exercise of undue influence within the standard-setting organization, allowing individual members or factions to convert the SSO into a vehicle for personal gain. For example, if multiple SSO members combined their own patents into a patent
pool, approved that pooled technology as the new industry standard, and then fixed industrywide licensing terms at unduly high prices, industry participants not included in the patent pool
would be adversely affected, as would the consumers of that industry's products. Furthermore, a
powerful faction of SSO participants with financial interests in a particular technology could adversely affect the bargaining process by distorting the ordinary selection process. For an example
of SSO capture, see Allied Tube & Conduit Co v Indian Head, 486 US 492,501 (1988) (extending
antitrust liability to the captors of a standard-setting organization, and encouraging SSOs to
adopt "procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members with
economic interests in stifling product competition"). For a discussion of SSO capture, see David
A. Balto, Antitrust and High-Tech Industries: The New Challenge, 43 Antitrust Bull 583, 600-03
(1998) (discussing the potential for anticompetitive harm through SSO capture); Mark A. Lemley and David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Cal L Rev 479,
522 n 186 (1998) (noting the harmful effects of capture on innovation); Lemley, 28 Conn L Rev
at 1081, 1086-88 (cited in note 8) (discussing several potential sources of SSO capture). For a detailed analysis of SSO capture through intellectual property rights, see Janice M. Mueller, Patent
Misuse through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 Berkeley Tech L J 623 (2002) (discussing
capture through member non-disclosure of pending or existing patents on proposed industry
standards).
90 For a detailed discussion of the many forms that patent collaboration can take, see Steven C. Carlson, Note, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 Yale J on Reg 359, 362-70
(1999) (discussing patent pools, joint ventures, cross-licensing arrangements, and other collaborative organizational schemes for blocking, complementary, and competing patents).
91 However, the exclusion of pooled or cross-licensed patents from the proposed bargaining system should not be read as an endorsement for per se illegality. Because the potential anticompetitive harms posed by these collaborative technologies will depend on the structure and
procedural rules of specific SSOs, a thorough rule-of-reason analysis seems appropriate for
multi-source price bargaining schemes, given the potential procompetitive results that bargaining
could have on price, output, and access.

2003]

Standard-SettingOrganizations

1005

the scope of the proposed bargaining system, thus preventing the anticompetitive harms associated with SSO "capture."'
The solution outlined above is subject to two major criticisms:
First, that the proposed bargaining process would create undue delays
in the standard-setting process, and second, that a system of price bargaining would reduce incentives to innovate and develop improved
proprietary technologies. While neither criticism is meritless, each objection misunderstands the current standard-setting process and the
broader benefits of single-source patent price bargaining.
Adding a bargaining phase to existing standard-setting procedures would undeniably create a delay at the beginning of the SSO
process. Negotiations over price take time, and if the product cannot
be used until a price is set, negotiations over price will hinder the
speedy employment of a standard. Critics may therefore argue that
single-source patent price bargaining is an unworkable solution, because it would hamper SSO activities and delay the implementation of
industry standards. However, this criticism ignores current delays in
the standard-setting process. Because patent policies are left vague,
individual SSO members must negotiate license terms with patent
owners after a proprietary technology is adopted as an industry standard. During this subsequent period of negotiation, the adopted standard is far from useful, since SSO members can use the new standard
only after completing negotiations over license terms. Because many
negotiations fail to reach an agreement over "fair," "reasonable,"
"nondiscriminatory" terms and end in high-risk litigation, the SSO
process currently experiences delays when implementing proprietary
standards. 9 The proposed solution would not exacerbate such delays,
but would instead shift them to the beginning of the SSO process,
thereby eliminating high-risk, time-consuming litigation after the
adoption of the standard.4
Other critics may decry the reduction of monopoly pricing for
patent licenses, arguing that a reduction in the revenues received by
92 Although many technologies involve pooled or cross-licensed patents, a significant
number of conflicts over "fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" license terms would be eliminated under the proposed single-source price bargaining system. See, for example, Townshend v
Rockwell InternationalCorp, 55 USPQ2d 1011, 1026 (ND Cal 2000) (dismissing an SSO member's attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize claims against an owner of 56K
modem patents); ESS Technology, Inc v PC-Tel, Inc, 1999 Dist LEXIS 23227, at *12-14 (ND Cal)
(dismissing manufacturer's Sherman Act and unfair competition claims against a single-source
licensor of modem patents, but allowing patent misuse and other claims to proceed).
93
See Mueller, 17 Berkeley Tech L J at 623 (cited in note 89) (noting that when conflicts
arise over license terms, "[a]bsent a mechanism to compel licensing, a hold-up problem ensues").
94 Furthermore, by conducting one consolidated round of negotiations before the adoption
of the standard, as opposed to many individual negotiations afterwards, the proposed bargaining
system could potentially reduce the time and transaction costs associated with licensing negotia-

tions.
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patent owners would diminish incentives to innovate and develop patented technologies. 95 It is certainly true that higher rates of innovation
are created by such incentives, and that reducing a patent owner's
revenues could lead to fewer investments in new technology. How-

ever, this criticism ignores the procompetitive effects of standard setting, effects that single-source patent price bargaining would encourage.% By improving access to patented standards and increasing the
size of network externalities, single-source patent price bargaining
would reduce the risk of research and development projects, thereby
encouraging future innovation and offsetting any long-term losses
created by a reduction in monopoly pricing." In light of the important
benefits of single-source patent price bargaining, neither the delay
caused by price negotiations nor the potential reduction in long-term
investments in research and development presents an insurmountable
hurdle to the proposed solution.

C. Single-Source Patent Price Bargaining Would Encourage
Vigorous Participation in SSOs
By obviating the need for vague licensing requirements in SSO
patent policies, per se legality for single-source patent price bargaining
would eliminate conflicts over "fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" license terms. SSOs would instead specify the terms of patent licenses, including price, prior to adopting a proprietary technology as
an industry standard. In turn, the potential liability created by conflicts over "fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" license terms9
95 From the outset, it should be noted that this criticism lacks substance unless the current
level of investment in research and development is the optimal level of investment, a presumption that lacks empirical support. See Carlton and Gertner, Intellectual Property,Antitrust and
StrategicBehavior at 29 (cited in note 29) (noting that "the determination of the optimal level of
R&D remains elusive," and therefore that "it does not follow that simply because creation of a
closed system may reduce R&D that the new level of R&D is less than optimal").
96 See notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
97 This trade-off between high rents and low risk may have independent efficiency benefits,
since it may reduce rent-seeking behaviors by patent owners. Rent-seeking will occur if patent
owners earn revenues far in excess of their fixed research and development costs, leading to
over-investment in research and development and causing detriment to other capital investment
programs. See, for example, Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington, Economics of Regulation andAntitrust at 90-95 (cited in note 65) (discussing the relative advantages of competitive innovation
through rivalry in research and development markets, as compared to Schumpeterian innovation
through monopoly rents, and illustrating that monopoly rents are not always required to achieve

high rates of innovation); Kenneth Dam, Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J Legal

Stud 247,251-52 n 14 (1994) (noting that rent-seeking leads not only to inefficient duplication of
research and development expenditures, but also "cause[s] R & D expenditures to be made at a
faster than optimal rate"). By encouraging innovation through reduced risk, rather than high
rents, rent-seeking behaviors may be reduced or eliminated, improving the overall efficiency of
capital investment.
98
See notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
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would no longer be borne by SSO participants, and current concerns
over SSO participation" would be moot. Accordingly, a single-source
patent price bargaining system allowing SSO members to bargain collectively with patent owners terms would not only result in lower
prices for patent licenses, but would also preserve incentives for vigorous SSO participation. By protecting the companies that form SSOs
(and the patent owners that offer their technologies as industry standards) from the specter of price-fixing liability, per se legality for single-source patent price bargaining would protect the numerous benefits that standardization currently creates.
D. Single-Source Patent Price Bargaining Would Achieve the Goals
of Antitrust Enforcement
If SSOs were allowed to bargain with patent owners over the
price and terms of patent licenses as part of negotiations with a single
patent owner, the resulting terms for patent licenses would increase
consumer welfare, swell the number of firms using the new proprietary standard, and encourage innovative research into new and improved products and services.' ° Accordingly, this system of bargaining
would create the effects that modern antitrust policy seeks to generate
and protect,' thereby achieving the goals of antitrust enforcement
through market mechanisms.
Under the current system, the price of patent licenses is determined after a proprietary technology has been adopted as an industry
standard. However, at that point in the process, the SSO has already
conferred incredible market power (in network industries, the entire
product market) on a patent owner. Given this market power, patent
owners have every incentive to offer licenses at monopoly prices, since
those licenses are necessary inputs for all market participants adhering to the industry standard. Essentially, the current system requires
uneven bargaining, pitting individual SSO members against a patent
owner with complete control over an SSO member's ability to participate in the product market.
However, under the proposed system, SSO members would be allowed to bargain collectively with patent owners over the price and
terms of licenses, thereby eliminating the inequality of actors in the
bargaining process."' SSOs could obtain lower prices for patent li99 See note 44 and accompanying text.
100 For a discussion of standardization's effects on innovation, see notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
101 See Part II.A for a summary of antitrust enforcement's concerns and goals.
102 The considerable bargaining power of SSOs is indisputable. At times, SSOs have convinced patent owners to waive all rights to or abandon their intellectual property rights in order
to become the industry standard. See Kelly Flaherty, Standard Operating Procedure,The Re-
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censes, thereby forcing patent owners to commit to competitive prices
in exchange for high market share. By locking the price of patent licenses in at a competitive level, single-patent price bargaining would
increase the patent owner's license output and eliminate deadweight
loss in the market for patent licenses. By reducing the price of patent
licenses and increasing license volume, barriers to entry would also be
reduced, consequently increasing the number of firms competing in
the product market (since more firms would have access to the industry standard). In turn, this increased use of the industry standard
would enhance and enlarge network effects, spurring demand-side
economies of scale and encouraging future innovation.
Standard setting is an unusual process, in that market participants
willingly select technologies as necessary inputs to production when
they select proprietary technologies as industry standards. Effectively,
SSO members collaboratively choose a technology and provide it with
monopoly status, accepting the threat of monopoly pricing in exchange for the benefits created by standardization. In this unique
situation, exempting SSOs from antitrust liability for price fixing
would allow the victims of monopoly pricing to arrange that monopoly's prices from the ex ante perspective, thereby reducing or eliminating monopoly pricing while maintaining the benefits of industry standards. Accordingly, a system of single-source patent price bargaining
would achieve the goals of antitrust enforcement through market
mechanisms, thus eliminating the high administrative costs and error
costs associated with litigation over the specific licensing obligations
imposed on patent owners by SSO patent policies. ' 3
CONCLUSION

Adopting a standard of per se legality for single-source patent
price bargaining between patent owners and SSOs would not only
achieve efficient pricing for patented standards, but would also encourage vigorous participation in SSOs since the bargaining process
would eliminate the risks of litigation over "fair," "reasonable," and
"nondiscriminatory" terms. This system would also eliminate the high
administrative and error costs associated with litigation over license
terms, suggesting that per se legality for single-source patent price
corder 1 (Dec 17, 1997) ("In order to hold on to the standard, [San Mateo based RSA Data Security] was forced to write a formal letter to the [Internet Engineering Task Force, an SSO,]
agreeing to make public its proprietary 'RC2' algorithm. The company also relinquished its
trademark rights to S/MIME and agreed not to dominate the working group in charge of developing the standard."). See also Carlson, 16 Yale J on Reg at 394-95 (cited in note 90) (describing
the SSO pressure that caused RSA to relinquish its patents in order to have its technology
adopted as the standard for email encryption).
103 See notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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bargaining is a more efficient tool for achieving the goals of antitrust
law than private or public litigation over "fair," "reasonable," "nondiscriminatory" license terms.

